That was a comment made during a recent Pineland Underground episode.
And it strikes me as true.
When a military school is good, the culminating exercise brings it all together.
If it falls short, it might be worth relooking.
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Two things clicked in this short episode from the Indigenous Approach.
First, there is no “universal algorithm.”
There is a desire [for] a physical formula that can explain everything. We will never know all the variables…
…all of the algorithms and all of our data analytics, what they give us is how we got to where we were in the past.
Brig. Gen. Derek Lipson, Deputy Commanding General – Support
He’s talking about the recent shift to all things data, all things analytics, and how that may be a trap. Fans of the blog will know that I’ve become increasingly skeptical of anyone claiming to have the answers, especially the answers to complex social phenomena.
Specifically, he references the book “The Eye Test,” which I haven’t read, but is now on the list.
Second, this leadership maxim that ends the episode: 4+1 – the four things leaders do and the one thing to keep in mind.
And the plus 1?
Maintain relationships outside of the military.
Staying inside the bubble can get real toxic real quick.
The episode concludes with a powerful anecdote that illustrates this. And if you have been in the military for any period of time, it will resonate.
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Episode 50 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
In Episode 50 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, our guests discuss the history of technological innovation, examples of current and burgeoning technologies that will impact future warfare, and how governments can (and sometimes cannot) regulate the development and distribution of potentially dangerous technologies to malign actors.
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Another episode from the Pineland Underground. This one discusses Robin Sage, the boss level of the Special Forces Qualification Course.
On today’s episode we are joined with the SWCS Chief of Staff COL Stu Farris, and MSG (Ret) Chris Rogers. We discuss unconventional warfare and how it applies to the Special Forces culminating exercise known as Robin Sage. We address some common misconceptions that typically are associated with military exercises that occur within the local population to help inform and educate the public.
Robin Sage and Unconventional Warfare | The real story of the Special Forces culmination exercise (YouTube / Apple Podcasts)
If you’re curious about what this thing is and why it is so important (or why it seems to always surprise the media), the episode is worth listening to.
Did you ever wonder where the name Robin Sage came from? It’s in the episode.
Robin Sage, derives its name from the town of Robbins, N.C., a central area of operations for the exercise, and former Army Colonel Jerry Sage, a World War II veteran and an Office of Strategic Services, (OSS) officer who taught unconventional-warfare tactics. Steve McQueen’s character Hilts in the film “The Great Escape” was based on Sage. Sage was an OSS operative, the forerunner of today’s Green Berets and CIA.
Robin Sage: Why The Final Test For US Army Green Berets Is Truly Unique, 1945
There’s a great vignette deep in the episode (~40:00 mark) that highlights how the ethical dilemmas leaders face in training can emerge years later in very similar ways during actual operations. This one features an NCO spending a little too much time with one of the indigenous partners and finding himself at the center of an ethical dillema that includes a potential forced marriage.
Yikes.
A little later, they discuss the ways that war gets “harder” after the bureaucracy sets. It’s an interesting conversation, and one that I’m accustomed to hearing, but don’t necessarily agree with. The reason we get “worse” at doing things isn’t always because of additional bueracracy or pedantic military systems. It’s often (and mostly) the fact that the strategy is flawed. The whole thing is an exercise in futility. There’s only so much you can do with what you have.
If only they loosened restrictions. If only they let us do our job.
“Well if they sent us some more guys and bombed the hell out of the north, they might, uh, they might give up.”
-Animal Mother, Full Metal Jacket
As the saying goes, “we can’t kill our way out of this.“
But that will never stop leaders who are committed to winning from trying to find ways to win. It’s a Kobayashi Maru and it’s how you get the GWOT effect.
Two closing thoughts: there is a quick mention of Yuri Bezmenov, the former KGB defector who many people will know from his interview where he discusses Soviet ideological subversion efforts. Interestingly, portions of that video found its place in the Call of Duty: Black Ops Cold War trailer a couple of years ago which spurred some informative articles exploring that video in a wider context.
And finally, I appreciated the recognition that one of the most terrifying things in the world is walking face-first into a banana spider while doing land navigation in the woods at night.
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Another episode of the Pineland Underground. This one was focused on the academic program at the Naval Postgraduate School and what that program could do for the force.
Here’s the line that grabbed my attention and inspired the headline:
“Special operations students have a superpower here – it’s not that these guys are going to split the atom or invent the longer lasting light bulb, but through their capability of navigating different cultures, navigating different groups of people, and [it’s] bringing them together around a common problem.”
Applied Design for Innovation | Graduate Program for Warfighters and Innovation Brokers, Pineland Underground
I’d argue that the superpower extends well beyond graduate school.
That’s really it, isn’t it?
“Can you get the State Department person on board? Can you get the tech startup founder on board? Can you get the neuroscientist from Stanford on board?”
Go on.
“Can you navigate all of these personalities, all these cultures, all these people, and mobilize them, understand their incentives, understand their identity, can you mobilize them around an innovation challenge?”
That’s the superpower right there. It’s less about having the power yourself, and more about unlocking it around you.
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Nice series from the Pineland Underground on misinformation/disinformation – with an aim at building resiliency and preventing being duped.
These episodes are short, each hovering around 10 minutes.
They also link to a great repository of additional information if you want to go deeper.
A very good – and necessary – initiative.
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Recently, I pulled out the books to define irregular warfare.
There’s more than one definition, as it turns out.
Courtesy of Dave Maxwell who flagged this.
From the 2018 NDAA.
If I am reading this correctly, the key element of irregular warfare (as defined here) is the use of a partner force.
Gone is the emphasis on “violent struggle” – instead we have “activities.”
Additionally, these activities occur in “competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.”
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Super-short episode from the Indigenous Approach (16 mins) that lays out the command’s new vision.
It’s all in the title: “We are the premier partnered Irregular Warfare force.”
I like it. It’s simple, short, and has enough meaning baked in without making me scratch my head.
And like many mission or vision statements, the words might mean nothing to some but everything to others.
I didn’t quite get the true nature of the ‘indigenous approach’ until I had a boss who told me just before a deployment:
“You won’t be graded on the things that your team does – you’ll be graded on the things that your partner does.”
That’s when it clicked for me. This is different.
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This is an interesting one that is kind of flying under the radar.
SOF operators do not currently receive any direct training on neurowarfare (indeed, most are unfamiliar with the concept entirely), and published research is strikingly limited. Of the small number of academic publications on the topic, only a handful directly address neurowarfare. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are uniquely positioned to confront the complex and dynamic threats neurowarfare poses but is currently under-prepared to take up the challenge. Part of the reason is a lack of general awareness. Although US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) prioritizes neuroscience research and innovation, especially for cognitive enhancement, comparatively less is known about neuroweapons that cause cognitive degradation.
CHANGING HEARTS AND BRAINS: SOF MUST PREPARE NOW FOR NEUROWARFARE
Admittedly, I don’t think I’ve ever heard the term “neurowarfare” before, but I understand the concept. This is how the authors define it:
Neurowarfare is the strategic takedown of a competitor through the use of neuroweapons that remotely “target the brain or central nervous system to affect the targeted person’s mental state, mental capacity and ultimately the person’s behavior in a specific and predictable way.
Ok, but wait a minute, isn’t this kind of like psychological operations?
Psychological operations share similar goals but achieve them through communication, typically over the long-term. Neuroweapons physically manipulate the brain and achieve immediate effects.
Right – these are the things that physically affect the brain. This is tough stuff. Ouch.
It’s an interesting article and I agree with the authors that we need to be accounting for this. Our adversaries do not share the same ethical concerns regarding the use of new technology to gain advantage. This is not a domain that we want to show up blind in.
The authors make three key recommendations:
The authors rightfully acknowledge the biggest challenge we face in this realm regards the ethics of it all.
The most difficult—and likely to be the most contentious—are the serious moral and ethical concerns of whether the United States should consider pursuing offensive neuroweapons. Should the United States pursue an offensive capability, even if only discovered accidentally through private sector research? If so, what sort of weapons would be morally acceptable to use and how should they be employed? Should these weapons be reserved for high-priority targets or will we get to a point where neuroweapons are routinely employed in conjunction with more traditional forms of warfare?
I have two chief concerns with this. One, anything “neuro” will likely be thought similarly as “psychological,” which people tend to treat as a “dirty word.” Second, when we “split” instead of “lump” the work becomes so specialized so as to be difficult to explain – or use.
And as always, Small Wars Journal continues to publish interesting things that remain on the margins of debate. This is another one that deserves discussion.
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I don’t have much to say about this, other than I’m not a fan of the phrase “getting after it.”
I’ve seen it used too often in briefs as a cheap way of not explaining what is actually happening and instead leaning heavily on an inference that good work is being done, but it’s just kind of hard to explain.
Worse, I’ve seen commanders watch someone brief them, seemingly perplexed or confused, and then have that confusion wash away when the briefer attests that they’re “getting after it.”
Getting after what?
It’s a term that seems to make more sense describing a fitness enthusiast’s zeal for exercise than a complex military operation.
This is also a relatively new term. I don’t know if it originated in the military, but it’s all over the place now.
It’s only a matter of time until someone makes a military movie titled “Getting After It.”
You can add this to other terms that stand in for things that require nuanced explanations, like “setting conditions.”
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Carrying the Gun 