The Truth Sandwich

Last week I wrote about the illusory truth effect – the psychological phenomenon wherein a lie that is repeated – even in refutation – is more likely to be remembered than the truth.

It turns out that there is a counter to this – the “truth sandwich.”

How to use it?

  1. Start with the truth. This is the frame.
  2. Introduce the lie – clearly stating that it is a lie.
  3. End with the truth.

It doesn’t always work. Especially if the recipient is no longer engaging in critical thought.

But for those who might be swayed, those who are still among the few willing to be wrong from time to time, it may nudge them towards the truth.

In the race to correct false information, the lie often gets too much air. You have to frame it in the right way.

And even then, most of the time the lie is not even worth refuting. Patience and trust will win the day.

Leaders – especially military leaders – need to suppress the urge to “do something” all the time.

“How are we countering this!?” screams the agitated military leader.

“We’re not, sir. It’s nonsense. And it will pass.”

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“Nicotine and bullets bring the world together”

Finally got around to watching Mosul, which I felt shamed into watching after reading this article that declared it “the best Iraq War film ever made.”

It was good. I enjoyed it.

It’s a different kind of Iraq War movie, though. It felt like the ruins of something that came before. It felt like an alternate reality of what would happen if it all went wrong.

Except it’s true.

I’m not sure that the world recognizes the incredible sacrifice shouldered by young Iraqi men and women in their battle against ISIS. Especially in Mosul. It all kind of happened in the back of the newspaper while we were otherwise distracted.

I especially appreciated the scene below, which captures the absurdity of the whole thing, in a blown-out dark room. The Mosul SWAT team meets with an Iranian Colonel who is in Mosul supporting the ha’shd al-sha’abi – the “Popular Mobilization Forces.”

They’re trading cigarettes for bullets.

This is what “strategic competition” looks like on the ground.

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The Illusory Truth Effect

“Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”

The illusory truth effect.

A lie oft-repeated serves as a cheap and comfortable alternative to the truth.

The illusory truth effect, also known as the illusion of truth, describes how, when we hear the same false information repeated again and again, we often come to believe it is true. Troublingly, this even happens when people should know better—that is, when people initially know that the misinformation is false.

Why do we believe misinformation more easily when it’s repeated many times? -The Decision Lab

Many of the posts here regarding “Army Myths” fall into this category. Most of the myths are beliefs held strongly mostly due to exposure over time.

There are two cures for this.

One is critical thinking. Stop and think about it for a moment before you commit your full being.

Two is to put the same thing at work for the truth. Unfortunately, the truth is often not as fun as the lie.

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Term Warfare

A dual release episode from the Cognitive Crucible and the Phoenix Cast.

In this crossover episode of the Phoenix Cast and Cognitive Crucible, John Bicknell is joined by John Schreiner, Kyle Moschetto and Rich Vaccariello. The podcast hosts discuss why they started their respective casts, how they view competition, the key take-aways of their casts, the top must listen episodes, and the other podcasts they listen to.

#78 PHOENIX CAST DUAL RELEASE

I think I’ve listened to a Phoenix Cast episode before, but I wasn’t a subscriber. I am now.

Two things that I took away from this episode. The first is the idea that podcasts like these are a form of “PME” – professional military education.

That seems like a no-brainer – of course they are. But there are still a lot of folks out there that don’t listen to podcasts – which is fine. It’s a form of media – but not everyone is into it.

The second thing is the concept of “term warfare.” This is something we see all the time these days when we’re trying to describe some niche element of warfare.

Credit to David Maxwell.

We should be careful when trying to introduce a new term into the already crowded military lexicon. There’s probably already a term out there that describes whatever you’re thinking about.

On the other hand, sometimes we do need a specific term. Sometimes that term matters.

Sometimes we should split. And sometimes we should lump.

I’ve got a few of the Phoenix Cast’s episodes in my queue. The focus of their podcasts is more cyber/IT – which is good, because I don’t get enough of that.

And speaking of “term warfare” and cyber – this is a reminder, cyber isn’t PSYOP. Cyber isn’t “IO.”

It is its own thing. And you have to understand it.

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An information “something” article that gets it right

A great, tightly written article over at MWI that looks at information through the “man, train, equip” construct of preparing the Army for war.

While emphasis on operations in the information environment and the cyber domain are certainly increasing, the balance of the military’s attention remains focused on force-on-force engagements during declared conflicts. Much of the time, information and cyber are given supporting roles for kinetic operations but recently, US Army Cyber Command announced a shift in focus from information warfare to “information advantage” for “decision dominance,” and is working to bring the concepts to the forefront of how the Army fights.

RETHINKING “MAN, TRAIN, AND EQUIP” FOR INFORMATION ADVANTAGE, Modern War Institute

Co-written by a PSYOP and Cyber officer, no less – folks in the game.

What I love about the article is that it’s not about the shiny stuff or promising some panacea through the right combination of “words and images.” The Army’s mission is to win land wars. Everything supports that. Instead of focusing on how this or that “information” tool can be used to support that, they focus on demonstrating how information already plays a key role in recruiting, training, and equipping the Army for war.

They talk about disinformation campaigns that target the military.

They talk about how lies spread faster than truth, the so-called ‘illusory truth’ effect.

How should the Army deal with this?

They write:

Specifically, to become proactive in the information environment, the Army needs to understand and predict how and what our competitors and adversaries are going to say, and be ready to deploy solutions ahead of, and in response to, competing and malicious narratives. One solution is teaching critical-thinking skills and inoculating the force by teaching soldiers to become more thoughtful consumers of media and information, especially regarding social media.

I love this.

Critical thinking is key. This isn’t going to be solved by artificial intelligence – at least not anytime soon. We need humans in the room who are astute across multiple domains and who understand the potential impacts of publishing that “edgy” Tweet or highlighting that training or social event.

This has application at both the individual and organizational levels.

Yes, we’re talking about “optics.” Optics are easy to dismiss, but they are actually important. What isn’t optics after all?

Doing the right thing is also important. We need critical thinkers who understand which way to lean at a given time. Is the juice worth the squeeze? What are the potential second and third-order effects?

That’s hard. That takes time.

On training, the authors write about how just about everything we do is now exploitable. Training is not just training anymore. It’s operations.

Specifically, they write about the Jade Helm exercise in 2015 which was the canary in the coal mine.

The information warfare tactics used against Jade Helm could be applied throughout the world, whenever and wherever the US military trains with partners and allies. In fact, we should assume those tactics will be used in the very locations that US servicemembers may be fighting the next war.

The idea of perfect secrecy is diminishing. If we want to compete, we need to recognize that now and start playing the actual game instead of the one we want to play.

Again, they offer a solution:

To gain and hold information advantage, the Army must assess the information environment before, during, and after domestic exercises—just as it does internationally—to understand the narratives surrounding the training and troop movements and to predict, preempt, and ultimately prevent false narratives from taking hold.

They close with the following:

Ultimately, the Army has taken the first steps toward recognizing the vulnerabilities inherent to the ubiquity of the information environment by pivoting away from information warfare—a term that preserves the peace-war dichotomy that is irrelevant in competition—toward achieving information advantage—a term that appreciates the information environment’s moral and cognitive aspects and its relevance to military readiness.

I’m growing to like the term “information advantage” as I get to understand it better. And couching it as they did – a term that “appreciates the information environment’s moral and cognitive aspects” – helps in understanding.

However, information advantage is such a big tent that it starts to lose some of its meaning. There are terms that we should lump and terms that we should split.

Information warfare is something that can be “done” – it’s an activity.

Information advantage – as I understand it – is a state, a confluence of things that puts a decision-maker in an advantageous position.

Information Advantage: A condition where a force holds the initiative in terms of relevant actor behavior, situational understanding, and decision-making through the use of all military capabilities.

What I’m saying is that I don’t think information advantage replaces information warfare (or psychological warfare). It’s something different, something bigger.

Kudos to the authors for a terrific, thought-provoking article.

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What if the PLA doesn’t need NCOs?

I’ve been a long-time reader of the Army’s “Mad Scientist Blog,” but I’m fairly certain I’ve never shared anything of theirs before – at least not on this blog.

From the ‘about’ page:

The Mad Scientist Laboratory blog is a marketplace of ideas about the future of our society, work, and conflict.

There’s something about the old-school ‘Web 1.0’ style of the posts that gets me all kinds of nostalgic.

Anyway, they also have a podcast that I only recently discovered. I started with this episode on How China Fights.

The format of the podcast is a bit different from many other national security podcasts I’ve listened to. There really isn’t a host that is driving the conversation – although they have a pretty intense announcer. Each episode has a main topic and then subtopics which are addressed by “subject matter experts.” It flows nicely.

There were a few things that struck me in this episode. The first is what gives this article its title:

What if the PLA doesn’t need NCOs?

This was said in response to a common retort one may hear about what makes a good Army. They may have the tech, and they may have the numbers, but they might be missing something. In the US, we hold our NCO corps in high regard and assume that is one of the things that gives us a qualitative advantage.

What if our adversaries can find a way to function without that? Is that possible?

Probably – but it’s an assumption that doesn’t often get challenged.

Two other things: China’s establishment of the “Strategic Support Force” and the concept of “information superiority” (think “air superiority”) during a crisis. I’ve never really thought about information that way – but I think there can be some relevancy – as the guest stated, in a crisis.

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The Return of the Skull Mask

Old fans of the blog may recall that I ran a series once that highlighted instances of soldiers across the globe wearing the now ubiquitous “skull mask.”

It was – and still is – a weird phenomenon.

The December issue of the “Sentinel” (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point) ran an article titled The Iron March Forum and the Evolution of the “Skull Mask” Neo-Fascist Network.

It’s a fascinating deep-dive into the origins of a disaggregated global extremist network. This isn’t a topic I normally spend a lot of time researching, but I found myself pulled into the research. It’s well done and one of the most “academic” papers I’ve read recently.

There were a few things that stood out which likely have application and relevance in others areas.

Some excerpts:

On the way that online communitites can forge strong bonds – over time – through shared interests. Fandom?

Specialized online communities, whether focused on Traditionalist neo-fascism or on model trains, aggregate groups of people with shared interests and values, and facilitate the formation of both personal relationships and collective identities through sustained interaction over time, requiring only that members share a common language.

Another example:

A group of users on the U.S. East Coast organized an online tabletop role-playing game group in which Iron March users played Dungeons & Dragons and a Star Wars game together.

On the challenge of translating online activity into real-world activism. This is something I’ve seen before (Egypt).

Offline activism was strongly encouraged by Iron March leadership, but members of the Iron March community appear to have been alienated from existing local neo-fascist organizations because of ideological differences, intra-movement conflict about tactics, and cultural differences between members of established neo-fascist organizations and young people steeped in internet-based subcultures.

The above – concerning internet-based subcultures and their inability to mesh with established “real world” communities reminds me of another research paper I recently read. This one is titled Gen-Z & The Digital Salafi Ecosystem. It explores the ways that internet meme culture – specifically alt-right meme culture – is being appropriated and used by a younger generation of “digital salafists.”

I’m skeptical if any of this means anything if significance. But I’m sure it means something.

Both paper are fascinating and relevant to anyone studying modern underground extremist movements.

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The Redundancy Effect

If you are part of an organization that does lots of briefing, then you have likely had a boss who can’t stand it when the briefer reads verbatim the text that’s on a slide.

“Thanks, I can read.”

This is a common pet peeve. Anyone can read text from a slide. People start to wonder, is the text simply there as a crutch for the briefer?

If you’ve been around long enough, you may have come across a briefer or a boss who takes this one step beyond and states that actually, reading the text from the slide helps solidify the information – because it is being read and heard at the same time.

Strong opinions abound on the topic.

If you actually care, there is research into this. Out of it comes something called “the redundancy effect.”

Basically, it has been determined that reading the text on a slide verbatim does not assist in information retention as it tends to overload the short-term memory of the recipient.

Better, is a mixed approach, where the briefer augments text with narrative.

Better still is to reduce the use of text on the slides altogether and instead use images, charts, or data to augment the narrative of the briefer.

What’s your opinion? I know you have one.

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The secret ingredient of innovation

Are you watching the “Get Back” documentary?

Maybe you saw this scene where Paul works and works and works and slowly finds the song he was looking for.

George is tired, Ringo looks on seeing something happening, but waits.

Anyone can learn how to play the guitar.

But it takes something different to make something new with it.

Mostly, it takes work. They’re in the studio, trying.

Hours and hours and hours.

It’s easy to write off innovation as talent. If it’s just raw talent, then we have an excuse.

But here we see it’s work. It’s a process. It’s showing up and grinding.

Eventually, something might pop out.

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