Spoiler alert: It’s PSYOP, but that’s a post for another time.
Recently finished ep. 46 of the IWI podcast with the very ominous title THE KILL CHAIN: WHY AMERICA FACES THE PROSPECT OF DEFEAT.
I haven’t read Christian Brose’s book yet (it’s on the list) but from the description, I think I get what he’s talking about.
America must build a battle network of systems that enables people to rapidly understand threats, make decisions, and take military actions, the process known as “the kill chain.”
The Kill Chain (Amazon)
A couple of things struck me in the episode. The first is the role of offensive cyber operations (OCO) at the tactical level. There was a good back and forth on where that capability ought to be. And if you’ve listened to Andy Milburn on other podcasts (which you should), you know that this is one of his chief interests.
Is OCO something that needs to get “pushed down” to the Brigade or below level?
Should platoon’s have a designated “hacker” assigned?
I’m getting serious Cyberpunk / Shadowrun vibes.
The second thing that struck me was the way that Christian closed out the episode. Really, everything from ~47:00 on is great but I want to focus on the below, where he is honing our attention on what actually matters if we want to be successful.
What are the things that we actually want our military to do? What are the things we’re prepared to fight for? What are the actual ends of strategy? What are we trying to accomplish?
Competition is interesting, but it’s not an end in itself.
This is exactly right.
One of the toughest things for military leaders to grapple with is the fact that if the ends are not clearly defined by the most senior leaders (military and civilian) then all of the thrashing done at echelons below add up to nothing.
It’s being sent overseas to divide by zero.
It’s how you get the GWOT effect.
Matt Armstrong argues the same when it comes to “information warfare” (a term he wouldn’t use). It’s not about the tactics or getting the right words and images together. All that is about as interesting as deciding to flank left or right.
No – instead, it is about having a clear vision, a direction we are headed, or a commander’s intent. Then, eveyrone below can march in step.
And what we’re talking about is political warfare.
How does the military fit into that?
To quote David Maxwell: “Irregular warfare is the military’s contribution to poltical warfare.”
It all starts to fit together if you can take a breath for a moment and let it sink in.
Lastly, this piece by Colonel Steven Heffington takes the strategy argument even further. He argues that what is needed is a “theory of success.”
…a theory of success, when clear, explicit, and well considered, is the strategic version of commander’s intent. It provides subordinate or lateral actors and institutions a strategy heuristic, allowing them to make decisions about the development of their own innovative, timely, and tailored responses to the evolving context. Simultaneously, a theory of success helps limit the play of operational and strategic creativity to the logic path set forth in the founding strategy, which facilitates rapid, tailored responses and iterative evolution of strategy while reducing the likelihood of line-of-effort or iteration fratricide.
CHANNELING THE LEGACY OF KENNAN: THEORY OF SUCCESS IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION
All good. I’m on board.
Here’s the rub. Leaders – at every level – have a responsibility to ask for that intent. To demand it.
Ask for that theory of success. If it isn’t clear, if doesn’t make sense, or if it is non-existent, it must be clarified.
Otherwise, we’re not going anywhere.
Enjoy the posts? Subscribe to the monthly newsletter.
Carrying the Gun 