I’m a week late to this article over at War on the Rocks – The Uncomfortable Reality of the U.S. Army’s Role in a War Over Taiwan.
It’s timely given the recent rhetoric. The article discusses the fact that we don’t like talking about the reality of what a war over Taiwan would look like.
I agree with that.
It’s a good article that lays out many of the grim realities, without acknowledging the potential – and likey costlier – mission creep, however.
There are a couple of assumptions in the piece that deserve a closer look.
First, that “a majority of the American public supports defending Taiwan in the case of a Chinese invasion.” The cited poll suggests that 52% of Americans would support the use of US troops to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
Wars are often popular before they start.
And in this case, when asked if the US should commit troops to defending Taiwan in the event of a Chinese “attack” or “invasion” (both words were used), 52% responded favorably.
Interestingly, a smaller number (46%) support committing to defending Taiwan before the fact. The polling suggests less an interest in Taiwan and more of an interest in China.
And that resonates – I don’t think most Americans spend much time thinking about Taiwan in the same way they didn’t spend much time thinking about Afghanistan.
Until we were there of course. And even then…
Still, the author is right to raise a flag here. If we are going to commit US troops somewhere we ought to know the costs. And the costs would likely be significant in terms of both American lives and expenditure.
How popular would it be then? And does that matter?
Second, the author writes that the Army is in the midst of an “identity crisis.”
“After the withdrawal from Afghanistan and facing a U.S.-Chinese competition that seems to play out on anything but land, the Army is struggling with an identity crisis perhaps as dramatic as its reinvention after the Vietnam War.”
Two things here: that the Army is facing an “identity crisis” and the US-Chinese competition plays out on “anything but land.”
The first (identity crisis) is a major claim. I’m not refuting it, but I’m also not seeing it either.
Is the Army really in the midst of an identity crisis?
Maybe, but it doesn’t feel like it.
Certainly we’re all coming around to recognize a new reality. GWOT is over (right?) and we’re waking up after a twenty-year adventure trying to figure out what the next big thing is.
But it doesn’t feel like a crisis. It feels more like going back to work. It feels like doing what we’ve always done.
To quote a senior special operations NCO on what we should be doing:
“I don’t think we need any more lines and arrows, I don’t think we need any more references to the NDS. I think everyone understands what the new threat is, and we just power it down to the companies and let the senior NCOs and Team Sergeants take charge of the training.“
That is what the Army is supposed to do.
Units have missions. Units train against those missions. And if called, units execute those missions.
That’s all there is.
Everything else is noise.
Second, the idea that US-Chinese competition plays out on “anything but land.”
Competition and conflict are often thought of and used interchangeably. Many make the assumption that because China is “over there” and we’re “over here” this is mostly a Navy/Air Force thing.
The reality is that competition is everywhere. Everywhere includes land. It also includes the digital world. And I don’t think the Army is spending much time navel-gazing wondering what its role is.
It’s too busy dealing with the reality of competition all over the world.