Incidentally, they just released episode 34 as well (CHINA’S STRATEGICALLY IRREGULAR APPROACH: THE ART OF THE GRAY ZONE).
I haven’t listened to the latter yet, but I’m willing to bet it will feature a discussion about how sly and cunning the Chinese are at IW (as opposed to the US).
I’ll say up front that the reason our adversaries rely on irregular warfare is because they have to — they really don’t have many other options.
And the reason they’re “good” at it is because they are not constrained by the same moral/ethical/legal boundaries that we are.
They’ll weaponize anything.
They also don’t have to contend with the political ramifications – as we do – of foreign exploits because of the authoritarian nature of their governments.
This doesn’t mean that we’re “not good” at IW, it just means we have to work a whole lot harder.
On to the podcast.
There were some great points made in the epsidoe and areas worth exploring further. These indlcude:
- We never fight the war we want (tanks/troops in the open, fire for effect)
- The difficulty training for irregular warfare (a day in the field represents a month 🤦♂️)
- An argument to send military “observers” to other nations/conflicts to build knowledge
- How personnel systems lose wars (this one is so true – and needs to more attention)
- The importance of language skills for SOF personnel
- The fact that SOF is and should be the primary actor in GPC – competing in the gray zone prior to conflict
Finally, towards the end there is a question posed as to what SOF should look like in IW. I’d offer it looks like a lot of things, but one of those is highly trained SF/CA/PSYOP forces out there doing there jobs. It’s the investment in human capital, not impressive tech, that will move the needle.