soldiering

The Hobbit on Yadkin Road: Jewel of Fayetteville

Maps

Three maps done by The Hobbit: NTC, Afghanistan (folded), Fort Hood.

The best things you learn in the Army you learn by word of mouth from good NCOs and officers (mostly NCOs). When I was a brand new Private in the 82nd Airborne Division, my first squad leader told me to go down to The Hobbit on Yadkin Road and get a proper cut and laminated map before I went out on my first field problem. I was new and impressionable and didn’t want to disappoint, so I did as he said, without question.

The Hobbit, mind you, is a hobby store very close to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It’s a nerd’s paradise full of Warhammer stuff, models, and role playing clubs on weekends (and I’m not judging, readers of this blog know my interests). When I opened the door in my green BDUs with rolled sleeves and a high and tight, meekly looking around as I stepped inside, the guy behind the counter, a large man with a Game of Thrones-esque beard quickly said “Map?”

“Yes,” I said.

“Right there in the box behind you. It’s fifteen bucks.”

I turned around and saw that indeed there was a box full of cut and laminated maps of Fort Bragg.

The Hobbit has made a small business out of cutting and laminating maps that are foldable and can be placed neatly in the cargo pocket of a soldier’s trousers. Since awkwardly walking into the hobby store back in 2001, I’ve sent every map I’ve been issued there to be cut and laminated and sent back to me.

I have no idea how long they have been providing the service. They don’t have a website or even a legit Facebook page. I’ve always just mailed them my maps with a hand written note of what I want and a phone number to call me to finalize the deal. It’s relatively inexpensive, fast, and the end product is a map, beautifully cut and laminated.

So, what I’m saying is, if you want your maps expertly cut and laminated, send them to The Hobbit. While there may be someone else that does it locally here at Fort Hood or other posts, I don’t know them. I know The Hobbit. They’re a known quantity and they’re good.

The Hobbit
6111 Yadkin Road, A
Fayetteville, NC 28303
(910) 864-3155

I’m a bit remiss to do this post, because I feel like I might be letting the cat out of the bag. But I like the service so much that I felt it would be helpful to spread the word.

About these ads
soldiering

Can a soldier wear a GoPro on deployment?

Military GoPro videos, like the one above, have become pretty popular recently. Sites like “Funker350” share the videos which get passed around rapidly in the military community online. The GoPro, for those who don’t know, is a company popular for selling small cameras that can be attached to things, like a soldier’s helmet, to capture human experiences as they happen from the virtual point of view of the person. They’re really popular in extreme sports, and the jump to the military isn’t surprising.

Watching the video above, it looks like a first person shooter video game, only it’s completely real.

This trend isn’t all that surprising. Cameras have gotten smaller, lighter, better, and cheaper over the years and social media thrives on pictures and videos of “extreme” things.

I have a hard time deciding soldiers wearing GoPros would be a good thing or a bad thing. In the “good” category, you would have a fairly accurate log of what occurs on a combat patrol because it’s live video. There would be no questions as to what happened afterwards because you could simply “roll the videotape.” Conversely, the same is true. What happens on patrol would not stay on patrol. There are things that may happen outside the wire that, if nothing else, might be pretty embarrassing.

Those two things together, the GoPro seems to be a positive addition, if for nothing else, to serve as a forcing function of good behavior. But, also conversely true, soldier behavior may be affected when they know the GoPro is watching them in a different way. Everyone knows about the “spotlight Ranger” who only performs when the leadership is there to see it. There is also a concern of a guy looking to get an “epic video” of him doing something that he might not even consider doing if it wouldn’t be caught on video. GoPro’s motto is “Be a HERO” after all.

Boiling that argument down, the pro of wearing the GoPro is “everything will be recorded” while the con of wearing the GoPro is “everything will be recorded.”

What are the rules on this, though, as it pertains to soldiers in combat?

While I wasn’t able to find any policies specifically banning the GoPro, General Order Number 1C (GO-1C), which governs troop behavior in the CENTCOM area of responsibility says:

 h. Photography and Videotaping.

          (1) Except as authorized for official use and purposes described below, this Order prohibits the taking, making possession, reproduction, or transfer (to include uploading) of photographs, videos, depictions, and audio-visual recordings of the following:

               (a) detainees or former detainees; detention facilities; active combat operations (e.g., firefights); flight-line operations or equipment, subject to written, local exceptions…

The order specifically prohibits firefights from being photographed or videotaped. If you read through the rest of the order, pretty much anything cool is banned with the exception of photography relevant to the mission – tactical site exploitation, for example.

My sense of things, as trends go, is wearing the GoPro or something like it, while spooky to senior leaders now, will eventually become mandatory in the near future. Surveillance and recording is not on a down-sloping trend. It would probably do us more good to embrace it now and get good at working with it sooner rather than let a populace armed with smartphones tell our story for us.

soldiering

Command Performance

There is a strange phenomenon you’ll notice when junior soldiers are around their leaders, especially in the first days and weeks that the leader shows up. It happens mostly when soldiers are in groups, lounging around, bullshitting. One of the junior soldiers might casually drop in a borderline inappropriate comment, or say something insubordinate. Usually tame at first, but often in increasing intensity. The whole purpose is to test out the new leader, to see how he is going to respond. The entire group is likely aware of the mild transgression – every one knows the rules and regulations.

This isn’t to say that this is a phenomenon that occurs at strictly the junior level. It happens at all levels. Junior soldiers (whether this be Privates to Sergeants or Captains to Lieutenant Colonels) test the limits of what their superiors will deal with by dropping lines and waiting for a reaction. I know I’ve been guilty of this with my bosses, both when I was enlisted and now. A firm statement to stop would be incredibly awkward and might make the superior appear “lame.” Ignoring the transgression, though, might breed a toxic culture.

Stranger, is I don’t think this “command performance” is done consciously. I don’t think someone says “Okay, now I’m going to go test the new guy, see where his left and right limits are.” I think it just happens spontaneously. Part of it is probably just trying to get noticed by your boss, and the quickest way to do that is to be outrageous or offensive.

As I’ve gotten older, I’ve noticed the ‘command performances’ that happen around me a lot more keenly. There is a purpose to it. A statement said in your presence that isn’t directly challenged might be construed as tacit permission. For example, a soldier that casually says “I really don’t like these side plates, I’ll probably just take them out” in the presence of a leader and it goes unchallenged might say later when he is scolded for not wearing his side plates that he had said he was going to do it in front of this or that leader and nothing was said then.

The ‘command performance’ is something to look out for. While it could be nothing, it could also be the very first sign in a long process that leads to a catastrophe. Once you recognize it exists, it’s a lot easier to spot. I don’t think the answer is to angrily reject any wild thing that is said as part of it, as that’s the fast track to isolation as a leader, but to tactfully steer the conversation back on track and demonstrate where you stand on the issue – clearly – without being a dick.

*Command Performance was a radio program that ran during World War II for deployed troops. Here’s a link to Judy Garland singing ‘Over the Rainbow’ on one of the shows.

soldiering

The strange fashion choices of off-duty soldiers

War is SchlepOne of the things deep in my blog ‘to-write’ list is something on the strange fashion choices of soldiers. LT Schlep at War is Schlep (who hasn’t updated since October) drew the above comic depicting some of the typical fashion choices of Lieutenants. Chillingly accurate, I’m afraid.

I always liked seeing guys heading to downtown Fayetteville to get dinner after getting released. Guys with giant cowboy hats, tight jeans and boots hanging with guys wearing do-rags and pants hanging off their butts. All 11Bs, though.

The other interesting thing is that once guys join the Army, their fashion sense is frozen in time. If they joined in 1998, they will wear whatever was in style then, and they are unlikely to update.

Weekends around a military town, at the local mall, or Best Buy is probably the best place to see this in action. It’s a sight to behold, for sure.

soldiering

Women in the Infantry: A Reflection on The Experiences of Allied Nations

Karina

On Facebook, I noticed a couple of my friends attended an event where female infantrywomen from allied nations were talking about their experiences. Outside of Facebook, I saw nothing on it. I asked Jason Lemieux, a friend whose work and writing I admire if he would be interested in writing a guest post on the event for Carrying the Gun, to which he agreed.

UPDATE: It has been brought to my attention that CrossFit proper has not replaced running in the Canadian Army. 

CAF’s Director of Force Health Protection has issued a Public Health Advisory against the unmodified use of CrossFit and other “Extreme Conditioning Programs” (ECPs). ECPs have been traced to several hospitalizations of CAF personnel in recent years. One case reportedly required dialysis to treat acute renal failure. 

The Directorate of Fitness, Personnel Support Programs has created a fitness program that borrows the most useful aspects of ECPs but it does not endorse CrossFit proper. From the Advisory:

ECPs, such as CrossFit®, P90x®, and Insanity®, have increased in popularity over the past few years. These programs are characterized by frequent, repetitious, high intensity exercises with very short rest periods between sets/cycles and little recovery time between workouts. Some ECPs do not encourage participants to progressively increase their workloads in an effort to allow for training adaption. CF personnel who participate may not have the requisite knowledge to properly set the required work to rest ratios to offset injury or illnesses possibly associated with ECPs. A disproportionate number of injuries such as muscle strains, sprains, stress fractures and rhabdomyolysis associated with ECPs have been cited in anecdotal reports and case studies, however, few studies have looked at the relationship between ECPs and injuries to date. (reference B)

ECPs are not endorsed by Personnel Support Programs (PSP), Directorate of Fitness (DFIT) or D FHP for reasons noted in para 4. DFIT has reviewed ECPs and has incorporated some of the recognized benefits into their physical fitness programs. To reduce the risk of injuries, DFIT has also developed a Tactical Athlete User Clinic, which educates and trains CF personnel on how to safely perform complex weight lifting techniques commonly found in ECPs (e.g., clean and squat). In addition, two courses (the Basic Fitness Training Assistant (BFTA) and the Advanced Fitness Training Assistant (AFTA)) are offered to CF personnel who are interested in leading safe and effective unit physical training. 

Of course, whether the more reckless aspects of CrossFit have caused injuries among CAF personnel needs to be analyzed separately from whether excessive distance running has also caused injuries. 

*B. Bergeron MP, Bradley CN, Deuster PA, Baumgartner N, Kane SF, Kraemer WJ et al. Consortium for health and military performance and American College of Sports Medicine consensus paper on extreme conditioning programs in military personnel. Current Sports Medicine Reports. 2011. 10:383-89.

Last week, I had the good fortune to attend a symposium on the experiences of allied nations with integration of women into combat arms units. The symposium was hosted by the Combat Integration Initiative, a joint effort of Women in International Security and SIPRI North America. Service-members of both genders from the US, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden participated. In my limited allied experience, it was a good personnel practice-sharing exercise between military allies. A few participants noted that they left the symposium with a better perspective on their own service.

For me, the symposium was as novel as it was enlightening. Even as an integration advocate, it was surreal to find myself making small talk with infantrywomen and even women infantry commanders. Much of what was expressed confirmed my pre-existing beliefs, so it’s fair to take my remarks with a grain of salt.

I’ve split this post into two sections. The first section is a far-from-comprehensive reflection on the symposium. The second section is a more detailed look at physical occupational standards, especially those of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Physical occupational standards are the latest source of contention as the US military branches prepare to implement the 24 January 2013 DoD integration policy (PDF).

Debates that are already over: Can women succeed in the combat arms?

Even without considering the experience of US servicemembers, including FET members who participated in ground combat, it is obvious that women can succeed in the combat arms. The Nordic infantry commanders seemed puzzled and maybe even a little bored with the question. “Here I am, a woman who led an infantry platoon in Afghanistan. There’s two days of this?”

I took from the symposium that the hallmarks of successful integration are maturity at all levels of the institution and a commitment to view and lead servicemembers as military professionals without consideration of gender.

A few observations in support of maturity:

  • At the individual level, the panelists used a typical military no-nonsense communication style to convey egalitarianism rather than self-importance, reason rather than bravado. They were over themselves.
  • The Swedish Marine Corps, which seems to have gone the furthest of the participating allies in creating a gender-blind force, does not distinguish between men and women in berthing assignment. Bathrooms, bedrooms, and showers are shared. People deal with it. This strikes me as the logical endpoint of integrating an expeditionary force.
  • The allied representatives had the eminently realistic view that sexual activity is both inevitable and manageable: Develop a set of ground rules and get over it.

That said, the Nordic personnel cautioned the American attendees not to overlook the cultural differences in the societies from which their militaries originated. Even with highly egalitarian values, the Nordic countries only integrated their combat arms in the last decades of the Twentieth Century. The US’ relatively elitist culture makes it all the more imperative that senior leadership accept integration as the new normal and impress upon subordinate commands that the time has come to integrate for the benefit of the military and of the country.

For the participating allies, successful integration required maturity not just at the individual or unit level but at the institutional level as well. When the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) allowed policy to follow the conclusions of valid scientific research in 1991, its physical occupational standards were overhauled. This change was presumably not without its associated cost and discomfort. In 2013, they changed the standards again, both to reflect lessons learned from Afghanistan and to incorporate new equations that reliably predicted occupational competence without respect to gender. The successful integration of women was the immediate-term goal. However, in the big picture, integration served as the impetus to create a test that truly measures occupational competence when lives are on the line. Will the US military branches follow this example?

Throughout the symposium, the duty of military professionals to evaluate fellow servicemembers solely on the basis of their occupational competence was reiterated over and over. Major John Steemann Adamsen, former infantry commander in the Danish Army, put it best: “In Iraq and Afghanistan, I never ‘led women.’ I commanded soldiers.” Women are valuable members of the combat arms team not because they bring special competencies or assets to population-centric missions (which vary by cultural context anyway) but because they perform to the same occupational standards as everyone else.

The US military personnel who spoke on the panels reported that where women were given the opportunity to perform to standard in combat roles in Iraq and Afghanistan, they were treated as valuable members of the team. Bryan Coughlin, a US Marine Corps infantry captain, realized that his poor experience with Female Engagement Teams (FETs) on his first deployment needed to be understood in context: he wasn’t really sure how to lead them, nor did he have the opportunity to properly employ them. On his second deployment, he was attached two FET personnel who became integral components of his infantry platoon. Yes, they went on every patrol in full gear and yes, they returned fire in contact. He is converted.

The connection between physical fitness tests and occupational standards

The relationship between physical fitness tests (PFTs) and occupational standards is especially relevant now because the US military branches are in the process of validating their occupational standards as gender-neutral to comply with DOD policy.

The acme of occupational relevance is to test personnel in the precise movements most often used in the course of their duties. Unfortunately, this becomes a logistical impossibility when applied to the many occupational components of a modern military organization. Instead, the participating allies have developed proxy tests that reliably approximate competence in one’s occupational tasks. I have decided to elaborate on the CAF’s occupational fitness test because it strikes me as an ideal legal and scientific model (and because I was not able to attend panels on unit cohesion, operational effectiveness, and culture; or recruitment and retention).

It took an act of human rights law to ensure equal opportunity in the Canadian Armed Forces. In 1989, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ordered the CAF to open all positions to women and to ensure that any physical standard is based on a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR). As such, the CAF PFT minimum standards are scientifically correlated to the essential tasks most likely to be performed in combat. The definitions of “essential” and “most likely” are key to understanding what makes an occupational requirement “bona fide” under human rights law:

Tasks are deemed “essential” according to the consequences that follow from failure to complete them. Essential tasks are those whose failure would result in at least one of the following:

  • Injury or death to the Canadian Armed Forces or to the general public
  • Compromise the outcome of a mission or operation
  • Cause significant damage to Crown (i.e., government) property

Unless the CAF can show that one of these three consequences is reasonably likely to occur as a result of failure to perform a task, then they cannot enforce the task as an occupational standard.

The six “most likely” occupational tasks that inform the current CAF PFT were identified from a thorough review of physically demanding tasks that CAF personnel have been historically required to perform in combat. For instance, after reviewing after action reports from Afghanistan and training exercises, Canada found that using the fireman carry to extract a wounded comrade is a nice fantasy but dragging is overwhelmingly more common (PDF).

Furthermore, in Afghanistan, vehicle extraction was required in 45% of CAF casualty evacuations. Since it is impractical to use vehicles in routine physical fitness tests, Canadian researchers developed a composite test that combined a casualty drag, grip test, and static squat test to strongly predict the ability to extract a casualty through a vehicle hatch. By limiting occupational requirements to essential and most likely tasks, the CAF kept those requirements grounded in the realm of the reasonable and empirical as matters of life and death should be.

The CAF occupational standards are also informed by the legal Duty to Accommodate, which states that Canadian employers must provide employees the leeway to complete occupational tasks with work methods to which they are individually suited. In other words, for the purpose of placing a heavy box on a high shelf, it is not the business of the CAF to dictate that a soldier favors the use of his/her arms or hips or legs. Their only business is whether the box makes it atop the shelf. (There’s a lesson here for the US Army, who recently found that despite a relative lack of upper body strength, women were able to load heavy objects by emphasizing their hips and core in the lifting movement.)

Initial research found that for some occupational tasks, the average servicewoman did not need to be able to complete as many pushups or situps as the average serviceman to complete the task. This is probably a cultural artifact: men enter the military with more experience in pushups and situps but these exercises are not especially relevant to combat. From 1991 to 2013, the CAF PFT reflected this finding, leading to perceptions of gender bias when the test was actually gender-neutral in terms of occupational outcome.

After another round of research in 2013, CAF instituted the FORCE program, which uses four exercises that simulate real-world combat movements closely enough to reliably predict performance in the six most likely occupational tasks without respect to the cultural artifacts of gender. Of the four exercises—sandbag lift, intermittent loaded shuttles, 20-meter rushes, and sandbag drag—women tend to have the most trouble with 20-meter rushes and the drag but over 90% of women are passing these events as of April 16, 2014.*

There are some interesting differences in the Nordic physical fitness standards (PDF which may be outdated in places). The Danish and Swedish PFTs are gender-blind, though perhaps not as predictive of occupational performance as CAF’s FORCE program. Both countries’ minimum PFT standards vary by occupational specialty, which in my opinion is their primary advantage over the FORCE program. According to Captain Nina Sofie Berg, a Norwegian infantry commander, Norway is looking into a similar system. Norway has separate PFT standards for men and women but its combat training standards are gender-blind. Also, in Denmark, platoons pass or fail the PFT as a unit. The intended lesson is that leadership and teamwork are necessary for success.

(More foreign nation military gender research can be found here.)

It was refreshing to see such transparent empiricism. It remains to be seen if the US military branches’ integration efforts will compare favorably. The US Marine Corps plan seems to be to correlate performance in occupational tasks to its existing physical fitness test—pullups, crunches, and a three mile run—and combat fitness test, which includes the historically irrelevant fireman carry, by Fall 2013 to “develop a physical screening test for MOS classification.” It is not clear whether the Marine Corps examined the value of these exercises as strong gender-neutral predictors of occupational performance but so far there is no indication that the Corps plans to modify or replace any of them.

On a related note, the US military community’s concern for women’s pullup strength seems out of proportion to the unique demands of combat. In the participating allied countries, upper body strength is measured with a more diverse set of exercises and in a smaller proportion to the rest of the PFT. Corporal Malin Tilfors, a female Combat Craft Driver in the Swedish Marine Corps, noted that the ability to stay awake without eating for days at a time has played a much larger role than upper body strength in her combat training. Either way, she meets the standard.

In closing, whatever was believed about women’s deficiencies in centuries past, it is now known that they can thrive as members of combat arms and infantry units. We should not be swayed by unfalsifiable assertions to the contrary. In particular, we should unequivocally reject attempts to turn this discussion of civil rights and military professionalism into an amateuristic contest of status that substitutes combat arms experience for scientific and historical literacy.

As a public institution, the US military has an obligation to honor the values of US society. We can do better than discriminating in employment opportunity on the mere basis of the circumstances of one’s birth. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s historic decision to overturn the 1994 combat exclusion policy was the right call, and the military branches should implement this policy intelligently and in good faith.

*Even before the FORCE program, the Canadian army PFT dispensed with irrelevant distance running in favor of a forced march. According to Colonel Jennie Carignan, stress injuries became less common and performance increased when some of the running in army physical training was replaced with CrossFit.

Jason Lemieux served five years in the US Marine Corps infantry and three tours in Iraq. He is currently a Policy Fellow with the Service Women’s Action Network. Jason blogs at Jasonlemieux.com. The views expressed here are his own.

soldiering

Nobody seems to care about the XO

Over the past couple of months, there have been a few articles on things a good Platoon Leader (PL) should do, or things people wish they did when they were a PL (69 TTPs for Successful Infantry Platoon LeadersWhat I Wish I Knew: Cadet to Lieutenant in Afghanistan). These articles are passed around for future and current PLs to digest. People have been writing these tips and lists for years.

The whole Platoon Leader thing is strange. Future officers – especially infantry officers – spend years thinking about what they’ll do when they finally get there and become a PL. They read memoir after memoir (after memoir after memoir). They watch movies and television shows about it. They are reminded  – ad nauseam – about how it will be the best time they will ever have in the Army, a dismal thought, thinking you might top out when you begin. All that time and energy spent fantasizing about that first job, a drop in the bucket of an Army career.

From the enlisted perspective, the Platoon Leader signs the hand receipt and a good platoon should be able to function without a Platoon Leader altogether. And as a very wise senior officer reminded me before I commissioned, “the Army doesn’t need platoon leaders – it needs field grade officers – the platoon will be fine with or without you, you are there to learn.”

And after that platoon time ends? Then what?

Some PLs get ‘speciality’ platoons (scouts or mortars), some move on to staff functions, others become Aides to Generals. And some PLs become Executive Officers, ‘XOs,’ second in command to the Company Commander. It’s an important job that pretty much no one spends any amount of time thinking about. I’m not sure anyone has ever written a memoir about their wartime service as an XO.

It’s a strange transition, PL to XO. You’re still a First Lieutenant (usually), like most of your fellow Platoon Leaders, so you don’t ‘outrank’ them, but there is no question that you are ‘over them’ in terms of where you stand in the chain of command. The PLs don’t call the XO ‘sir’ or ‘ma’am’ and since they are likely the same rank, no salutes are exchanged. If the unit’s officers are tight, it is likely that the XO and the PLs already know each other pretty well and might even hang out with one another on the weekends.

Since there are no good resources to go to, no memoirs or movies that glamorize the role of the XO, the XO is very much defined by the Company Commander and First Sergeant. Sure, there are things that most XOs take care of – maintenance, coordinating chow and training, for example – but these things are often also attended to by the Commander and First Sergeant. The lines blur.

Specifically interesting to me is the relationship between the XO and the Platoon Leaders. Is it the XO’s role to ‘wrangle’ the Platoon Leaders and keep them in line with the Commander’s intent, or is that outside of his lane? Should the XO serve as a ‘sounding board’ for the Platoon Leader’s gripes? Should the XO provide mentorship to those PLs or leave that to the Commander? How is the XO supposed to manage the social relationship with the Platoon Leaders now that he is “second in command?” Can he still go get drinks with them after work, or is that now unprofessional?

Of course, it is easy to say “the commander should make clear his expectations of his XO in his initial counseling,” but the reality is that these transitions are usually fluid and fast. They’re often over before they start. When a Platoon Leader steps in front of the platoon and gives “the speech,” he’s thought and trained about that moment and the coming moments for years. The poor XO gets a text message late on a Friday night that says “ur new XO of B CO starting monday good job.”

What I’m saying is I think we’ve reached max capacity on Platoon Leader articles. I can sum all of them up with the below quote, anyway:

Be really good at everything at all times and you’ll be fine.

I’d really like to see an article titled “69 Tip and Tricks to be a Successful Executive Officer.” I welcome your comments.

 

soldiering

Two o’clock in the morning courage

Napoleon at the Sphinx

A couple of months ago, in a professional development session, the subject of ‘2:00 AM courage’ was brought up. We were reading about Napoleon, who had this thought about courage:

When he mentioned courage, Napoleon had also in mind moral courage – what he liked to call “two o’clock in the morning courage.” When bad news comes to a person at that hour, it is dark, he is alone, and his spirits are at low ebb; it requires a special brand of courage at such a time to make the necessary decision. Such courage is spontaneous rather than conscious, but it enables a general to exercise his judgement and make decisions despite the unexpected or the unfortunate surprises.

I don’t think this type of courage is relegated just to the late night or early morning, but also to generally trying circumstances. Said plainly, it is easy (or easier) to make difficult decisions when seated comfortably in the office chair or even in the middle of the day at the Company CP. It is an altogether different task to make a difficult decision when time is short, morale is low, and there is an overwhelming desire to slow down or get some rest.

It is in these situations that I’ve always found value in asking myself “what is the right answer?” Usually, we know what the “right answer” is, and by simply asking the question, the right thing to do reveals itself. By ignoring that question, it is easy to slide by, and ultimately, do the wrong thing.